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Executive Summary 
 
Pakland Cement is a rag-to-riches chronicle of a popular and a leading 
Pakistani cement company. However due to imbalanced financial structure, 
imprudent leadership and speculative decision-making became a candidate 
for a takeover in 2004. Most successful CEO’s who are not personally 
committed to any one set of beliefs but are able to shift gears quickly in face 
of rapid succession of events make their names in history. Family owned 
businesses need to determine a cogent succession path for the continuing 
prosperity of the company.   
 
It is primarily for this reason that the Code of Corporate Governance has been 
institutionalized the world over equally applicable to a private concern which 
turns public. The need for the hour is the enforcement of this Code in letter 
and spirit not only to safeguard the public interest but also to ensure good 
health of the company. It would not be a tall order to recommend a member 
from the regulating bodies on the Board of Directors.  
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Pakland cement is a sad saga of a booming cement industrial unit which 
crumbled in just two decades due to strategic blunders, inappropriate control 
measures and inept managerial culture. From being a market leader in 
southern Pakistan in the late 1980’s the firm is acquisitioned by another 
business magnate in 2004. 
 
Pakland Cement came into being in 1980 as a public limited company due to 
visionary direction of its founder Mr. Mohsin Siddiqi who later also became a 
senator in the Government. Within a short period, the company became a 
leading cement producer in the southern region of Pakistan. By 1990 the 
worth of the company soared to Rs. 2500 million. Though lady luck also 
favored Pakland since it was a construction boom period in Pakistan but 
prudent policies also paid dividends. It is tragic that these soaring heights 
were extinguished abruptly by a gunmen attack on Mr. Mohsin Siddiqi on 7 
Feb. 1990.It was at this juncture that the mantle of leadership fell on the 
shoulders of Mr. Tariq Mohsin the eldest son of the founder member. He 
inherited an empire well entrenched as a leader in the cement industry. It is 
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common in family owned businesses in Asia that succession is transferred to 
siblings and boards of directors are little more than rubber stamps (Lamb, 
R.B. 1987 
The case study examines how inappropriate management practices result in 
quick demise of a stable industrial concern. The importance of succession 
planning in family based businesses, balanced financial structure and 
participative management are also some lessons drawn from this study.  
 
2.0 History of Cement Industry 
 
Cement manufacturing in Pakistan has witnessed oscillations of growth and 
decline in the past few decades. During periods of growth, unrealistic 
optimism brought expansion and profitability while in slumps the units braved 
the environmental threats. Growth of cement industry is rightly considered a 
barometer for economic activity. In 1947, Pakistan had inherited 4 cement 
plants with a total capacity of 0.5 million tons. Some expansion took place in 
1956-66 but could not keep pace with the economic development and as such 
the country had to resort to imports of cement in 1976-77 and continued to do 
so till 1994-95.  The industry was privatized in 1990 which led to setting up of 
new plants. Although an oligopoly market, there exists fierce competition 
between members of the cartel today. More than 26 firms (23 in the private 
and 4 in the public sector) compete for the domestic market of over 19 million 
tons (Table 1). The northern region has over 87% in total cement dispatches 
while the manufacturers based in the southern region only contributes 13% to 
the annual sales. The production of cement has been rising steadily, growth 
fluctuating between 5% and 20% per annum during the last two decades. In 
1991 it was 7 million tones which had increased to 16 m tones in 2006 
(growth rate 9.75%). (Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2006) 
 
Table –1 
 
Province Number of Cement Units in Pakistan 
 Operating units 
Installed Capacity in 
Millions 
Islamabad 1 0.625 
Sindh 8 3.643 
NWFP 6 5.324 
Baluchistan 1 0.63 
TOTAL 24 17.113 
Source: Cement Manufacturing Association Report 2004. 
 
 
The Mohsin family (owners of Pakland) had migrated from Lucknow, India in 
1947 and had no previous business background. However prudent 
investments and disposals in real estate helped built equity to set-up a 
cement plant. Pakland Cement was established in 1985 located near Dhabeji 
a town about 50 miles north of Karachi. The project of Pakland was funded 
through allocation of 128.25 million French francs through the National 
Development Finance Corporation (NDFC). It also syndicated a financing 
package. About 75% of sales are in the southern region while the remaining in 
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the rest of the country. Undoubtedly Pakland was a popular brand and a 
market leader in the early 1990’s. The production of cement varied between 
400000 tons to 450000 tons between the period 1998 to 2003 with some 
slump in the demand in 1999, 2000 and 2001 however it never operated near 
its maximum capacity. The sales represented 4 % of the market share in 
2003. The management of the company though inexperienced managed the 
firm well but later fell prey to domineering, and idiocy leadership style of the 
family icon.   
 
Tariq Mohsin remained associated with Pakland since its inception. It would 
not be wrong to say that this venture was actually his brain-child. Tariq is 
remembered as an easy going person who led a life in opulence, surrounded 
himself with coterie of senior managers who were more the yes-man kind. 
Their advices were unprofessional yet Tariq trusted them. Today ex-
employees whisper that many of them indulged in rampart corruption. Tariq’s 
managerial style reflected a Zeus kind of image, believed in centralization, 
one man decision and rewarding people magnanimously beyond their 
performance and expectations; style no wise businessman will recommend. 
Wastage of finances and indulgence in petty projects are two major 
accusations against the CEO. His routine was another major idiosyncrasy, an 
employee had to attune himself with; start work very late and leave office in 
the wee part of the night. Pakland was a tall organization where decisions 
were made at the top therefore could not evolve a culture of excellence in-
spite of fame and earnings.  
 
 
3.0 Production Process 
 
Pakistan’s main sources of energy are fuel gas, oil and petroleum products for 
all industries. Coal only contributes 5.4% to the energy needs of Pakistan, 
although its proven reserves exceed 4000 million tons. Until 1970 the cement 
plants were installed on wet or semi-dry process technology, sophistication 
came in 1980 when switch was made to dry process. The process is to a 
large extent determined by the condition of the raw material. The production 
of cement is a continuous process and is highly energy intensive. Lime stone, 
clay, iron ore and gypsum are used as major raw materials for different 
categories of cement. These minerals are in abundance in Pakistan.  
 
The cement manufacturing process begins with Calcinations; decomposition 
of limestone at very high temperature. This is followed by Clinkering where 
additional compounds are added in different proportions. These compounds 
are then milled together with gypsum and other additives to form cement 
(Figure 1). The energy costs in form of fuel (now coal) and electricity 
represents 50% of the production cost. The products as a result of this 
process are ordinary Portland cement (OPC), sulphate resistant cement 
(SRC), blast furnace Slag cement (BFSC) and white cement.  
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4.0.0 Problems of the Industry 
 
Unprecedented increase in the furnace oil and electricity prices had crippled 
the cement industry in the late 1990’s. The low demand of cement and high 
interest rates coupled with overall economic crises left the entire industry to a 
meager growth of 3% from the earlier growth of 7%. Consequently the entire 
cement industry was running much below its capacity despite having a strong 
industry base. 
 
The real entrepreneurs (Pioneer Cement) took some bold and timely 
decisions when they        decided on the conversion of the cement industry 
from oil/gas to coal fired system in Pakistan. This proved to be the point of 
turnaround in 2002. However the conversion of fuel was not the only 
contributor for bringing this turnaround; expansionary economic policies of the 
government and export demand from Afghanistan also acted as catalysts. In 
the year 2002, most of the units had recovered their losses and net earning of 
Rs. 948 million was reported by the industry. The switching from fuel to coal 
requires substantial capital investment. It is reported that approximately Rs. 
160 million is the conversion cost. However the saving in the production is 
around Rs. 250 per ton or 12% of the production cost 
 
Another problem faced by the Industry was the high taxation. The general 
sales tax (GST) is 186% higher than India. The impact of this tax and duty 
structure has resulted in almost 40% increase in the cost of a cement bag (50 
Kg). A bag in India costs Rs. 160 as compared to Rs. 220 in Pakistan. In the 
budget of 2003-04 a duty cut of 25% was permitted to the cement sector with 
assurance from the cartel to pass on this benefit to the consumers. In 2006, 
the price of a bag went up to Rs. 430 however in 2007 it has stabilized at Rs. 
315/ bag. The export of cement has opened new opportunities for the cement 
industry. In 2007, the exports to Afghanistan, UAE and Iraq touched 2.13 
tones. 
 
5.0.0 Expansion in late 90’s 
 
We find Pakland well entrenched in 1994-95 with net profits exceeding 15%, 
debt to equity ratio is under control and working capital is adequate. At this 
juncture the cement industry was doing well and it was anticipated that there 
is room for expansion therefore Pakland set up another line of production at 
their Dhabeji facility; subsequently they also planned on setting up the Saadi 
cement at Taxila. This expansion was through a consortium of leasing 
companies and financial institution like PICIC and leading banks.           . 
 
The pricing mechanism was regulated by State Cement Corporation of 
Pakistan (SCCP) till the early 90’s. Being the market leader it maintained a 
balanced price structure and a cement bag of 50 kg was priced between Rs. 
80- 90. With the privatization of cement industry in late 1990’s SCCP lost its 
control over the supply side of cement and prices soared. This high demand 
and expectations of high earnings also prompted the industrialists to invest in 
this sector, leading to setting –up of five additional plants throughout the 
length of the country in late 1990’s. The fact that the government was also 
reducing the size of the Pakistan Social Development Program (PSDP) each 
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fiscal year was not taken into account which eventually led to excess capacity 
in 2001 and thereafter.  
 
Pakland remained a popular brand name in southern Pakistan in late 1990’s 
and a strategic decision was taken to expand into the northern part of the 
country by setting up another plant. This decision was probably based on the 
assumption that export orders from Afghanistan would be forthcoming and 
this opportunity should be capitalized. Furthermore the construction boom 
was more evident in Punjab as compared to the southern part of the country. 
 
Saadi cement commenced its implementation in 1999 with an asset base of 
Rs. 5380 million financed 64% through loans and financial leases obtained 
from banks and other financial institutions. Saadi cement was set-up in Taxila 
near Rawalpindi catering to the demand of the northern part of the country.   
One of the major decisions affecting the profitability of Pakland was the 
investment in Saadi cement in 2000.It invested Rs. 800 million in this venture 
and it was anticipated that the plant will go into operations in 2001 but the 
production got delayed till 2003. The plant was financed through a loan of 
65% which swelled up to Rs. 391 million in 2004. The financial liabilities also 
included redeemable capital of Rs. 5 billion. In 2004 Saadi was also taken 
over by the Dewan Mushtaq Group. Saadi project by Pakland was beget with 
certain flaws:- 
 
• The project was financed through a loan of 64% through leasing and 
financial sector at excessively high mark-up (KIBOR) on the 
assumption of speedy completion and commencement of operations. 
This did not materialize and resulted in accumulation of interest. 
• Equity/ Debt ratio in this project is subject to lot of debate. It is highly 
improbable that the operating profits after operations, even under best 
of conditions would have taken care of the paid up interest.  
• It was highly unlikely that that the production would commence in 2001, 
however when it did in 2003, production did not cross 250 thousand 
tonnage; a figure very petty compared to plant capacity. 
• Operational difficulties were not visualized professionally nor 
meticulously, e.g. sufficiency of land, access to the quarries and power 
requirement for the plant.   
• The land acquired for plant was inadequate which hindered the 
production facilities. 
• The bureaucratic hurdles in shape of sanctions, feasibilities and power 
politics led to delays in erection of plant. The advantage which Pakland 
once had in the lifetime of founder chairman and senator was no more 
there! Tariq Mohsin was a non entity in the political arena and had not 
nurtured old social linkages. 
 
 
6.0 Financial Imbalances at Pakland 
 
Pakland’s choice of sources of funds for expansion as well as investments in 
Saadi cement was not based on plausible assumption. The capital structure of 
equity versus debt was highly leveraged in an industry which is labor intensive 
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where rewards or returns are not assured. This soundness proved correct and 
the company could not honor its financial liabilities  
 
The financial health of the company reflects gross mismanagement during the 
period 2000- 2003. The financial reports for this period are attached as Table 
2 and 3. ICON international consultants reveal that Pakland is a highly 
leveraged firm as compared to the industry. There is an imbalance in the 
Pakland balance sheet structure as compared to global benchmarks. 
Questions like whether the firm should hold more cash and short-term assets 
or does it concentrate on physical plants and equipment? Professor Parker of 
INSEAD comments that, “we are intrigued by the wide variations in the 
financial and the productivity measures between Pakland and other 
companies” (Icon consulting press release, 2004) 
 
Marketing experts speak of assembling a blend of different strategies as 
marketing-mix. Likewise, effective corporate finances require a financing mix, 
an effective blend of financial sources matched to a variety of different uses. 
Instead of locking on long term financing, Tariq Mohsin increasingly tied the 
firm to short term credit arrangements at higher interests. Could Pakland 
clean-up the balance sheet by re-engineering strategies like joint ventures; 
rather than accumulating debt and becoming a takeover candidate? 
 
Financial controls and cost benefit analysis are common studies in 
manufacturing concerns. It is surprising that the auditors of the company 
failed to alert the management during the period 2000- 03 of the impending 
disaster due to accumulation of loans. The company was also listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange since long yet no cognizance was taken by any 
authority to ensure that it operates within the purview of Code of Corporate 
Governance? 
 
7.0 Managerial Inefficiencies 
 
Pakland’s tall organizational structure remained overstaffed most of the time. 
The remuneration offered to senior executives were magnanimous 
supplemented with additional perks. The PCL statement of accounts for the 
period 1999- 2003 reflects that the general and administrative expenses kept 
increasing despite non- profitability. The top echelon was mostly subservient 
to the intuitive instructions of the CEO.  Before the acquisition of Pakland by 
the Dewan Group the finance director embezzled and fled abroad who was 
one of the trusted deputies. 
 
Asset management control is the acid test of a CEO. In this instance after the 
strategic decision to set up the Saadi cement, the performance of Pakland 
kept deteriorating. An analysis of balance sheets bears testimony to this fact. 
Inventory turnover, cash flows and other turnovers were the main effected 
areas. All these indicators reflect the inefficiencies of management, 
noncommittal attitude of the middle management and incompetence at all 
levels. It is a classic case of “Group think” where no conflict or criticism 
emerged in planning or decision making to turn-around events. Family 
businesses turned public need to determine their succession training in a 
more professional manner; can the Board of Directors make an effort in this 
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direction when majority shares are held with party who may be acting 
detrimental to firm interests?   
 
Tariq Mohsin experimented akin an entrepreneur however never planned like 
one; in 1990’s with much liquidity generated from cement operations he 
indulged in petty projects like diversifying into cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and 
even farming. Feasibility studies were conducted by amateurs and lacked 
determination. At the factory premises in Dhabeji, promises were made to 
local inhabitants of free electricity against sale deeds which could not be 
honored. This resulted into law and order situation later. At the time of 
expansion of plant in 1999 loan was negotiated at preposterous terms. The 
Saadi plant feasibility lacked important details like access to plant facility, time 
scheduling and political pressures.   
 
At one stage religious fervor gripped him intensely and many employees used 
to go to perform Hajj rituals at company expense every year while at times 
grand “mushairas” used to be conducted in main cities of Pakistan. Corporate 
social responsibilities of such kind were not compatible to the financial health 
of the firm.    
 
 
8.0 Take over by Dewan Mushtaq Group 
 
The sales revenue of Pakland kept increasing at an improved price level (Rs. 
1031.199 million in 2003 against Rs. 927.551 million in 2002) however the 
accumulated losses broke their backs. (Rs.72 million in 2003). Under these 
conditions the creditors refused to reschedule the loans and prompted the 
Dewan Group to take over the firm in May 2004. The company did not pay 
any dividends since 2000 and the shares slid downwards to a dismal level of 
Rs.84 per share. The current liabilities of the company exceeded its current 
assets by Rs. 148 million and the company was unable to redeem its TFC on 
maturity and the internal auditors in their annual report 2003 expressed their 
concern that “ the company’s ability to continue as a going concern is 
doubtful.” The affairs of the company in virtually every area of operation had 
been mismanaged for years and there was a strong possibility that the 
company stood on the brink of impending disaster lest it agreed to a takeover. 
Had Tariq Mohsin negotiated a deal with the creditors and got himself some 
breathing space, could the management change be avoided? 
 
Dewan Group is one of the leading conglomerates with diversified business 
interest ranging from fiber to sugar, from textile to trading and automobiles for 
over 8 decades. The DMG decided to diversify in yet another sector which 
always had a potential for expansion and profitability if managed in a business 
like manner instead of whimsical aberrations. The new management and the 
creditors negotiated a package for re-structuring the debt obligations of 
Pakland Cement. These negotiations resulted in revision of terms and 
conditions and some waiver of debts by the financial institutions. These 
confidence measures brought confidence amongst the creditors and the 
change of management was accepted by them and the company was 
renamed as Dewan Cement Limited in the memorandum and articles of 
association in 2004. 
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One of the first steps the new management took in 2004 was to stabilize and 
improve the efficiency of the plant. The plant was being operated at a very low 
inventory of coal and the kiln had deteriorated. 42 tons of bricks were airlifted 
to save the downtime of the plant. Similarly Sui gas connection was restored 
and 40% of the power requirement is now met from gas. This has resulted in 
reduction of coal consumption and has brought in substantial saving. The 
management also took notice of unscheduled shut-downs and now maintains 
adequate reserves of store items. PCL cost of goods always hovered between 
82-86 % of sales which have been controlled by the new group to 72% in 
2006. 
 
In 2006 the prospects of Dewan Cement have improved tremendously. The 
brand name of Pakistan has now been changed to Dewan Cement. The 
production level has increased to 654,000 tons (increase by 55% since 2004), 
financial liabilities of up to Rs. 500 million have been discharged in the 
preceding two years and thus the Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited 
(PACRA) has assigned the long term as well as the short term credit rating of 
“A” to the company; denoting a low expectation of credit risk and strong 
capacity for timely payments for financial commitments and EPS has risen to 
Rs1.86. The firm is now in safe hands. 
 
ISSUES 
1. What succession policies can a family based business follow in order to 
ensure perpetuity of the firm? 
2. Had the CEO negotiated a deal in 2004 with the creditors and got himself 
some breathing space, could the management change be avoided? 
3. What is the responsibility of Board of Directors when majority shares are 
held with party who may be acting detrimental to firm interests?   
4. What are the responsibilities of auditors, corporate bodies and SECP to 
ensure that that a public limited company operates within the purview of Code 
of Corporate Governance? 
5. Could Pakland clean-up the balance sheet in 2004 by re-engineering 
strategies like joint ventures; rather than accumulating debt and becoming a 
takeover candidate? 
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Table -2  
 2006* 2005* 2004 2003 2002 
 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS      
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS      
Operating fixed assets 6125013 5475863 5,057,069 405,897 442,099 
Capital work-in-progress   347,193 6,761,838 5,898,360 
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NON-CURRENT ASSETS 6,125,013 5,475,863 5,404,262 7,167,735 6,340,459 
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 951,273 911,296 800,000 800,000 800,000 
LONG-TERM LOANS 1,329 824 1,092 1,846 423 
LONG-TERM DEPOSITS 21,415 2,105 2,524 7,086 8,530 
DEFERRED COSTS      
CURRENT ASSETS      
Stores and spares 346,435 225,766 183,744 209,912 212,787 
Stock-in-trade 186,703 132,279 28,916 26,417 46,410 
Trade debts 81,841 87,087 30,463 26,828 29,282 
S 125,102 122,849 47,677 84,762 130,793 
Deposits, prepayments and 
other recievables 16,072 11,303 7,498 251,425 251,850 
Short-term investment 9,034 4,121 6,044 8,812 - 
Cash and bank balances 76,751 108,067 22,070 2,984 1,980 
Current Portion of Long Term 
Loans   528   
Due from an associated 
undertaking   16,803   
    54,874 29,658 
 1,144,090 966,182 343,743 666,014 702,760 
TOTAL ASSETS 8,243,120 7,356,270 6,551,621 8,642,681 7,852,172 
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES      
SHARE CAPITAL AND RESERVES     
Authorized capital      
150,000,000 
(1999:150,000,000)      
Ordinary shares of Rs.10/- 
each 2,243,157 1,088,554 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 
Issued, subscribed and paid-up 
capital   825,000 825,000 825,000 
Revenue reserve   23,540 393,444 322,711 
   848,540 1,218,444 1,147,711 
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES   813,408   
LOANS FROM DIRECTORS 
AND OTHERS    6,356,811 5,516,713 
REDEEMABLE  CAPITAL 2,629,795 3,028,869 3,346,933 44,672 44,672 
LONG-TERM LOANS 715845 499843 44,672 185,137 192,144 
LONG-TERM DEPOSITS AND 
RENTATION MONEY   18,981 23,592 25,496 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
FINANCE LEASES      
Liabilities against assets 
subject to finance lease 28,791 264 4,907   
Security Deposits   134,215   
IMPORT BILLS PAYABLE      
CURRENT LIABILITIES      
Short-term loans   92,400 - 201,084 
Short-term finances    124,734 - 
Current portion of long term 
liabilities 533,311 308,376 651,204 689,291 723,929 
Income tax payable 20,403 29,697 20,194 - 423 
Creditors, accrued and 
Liabilities   651,204   
      
 1,286,146 933,925 834,837 814,025 925,436 
CONTINGENCIES AND 
COMMITMENTS      
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TOTAL EQUITY AND 
LIABILITIES 
8,243,120 7,356,270 6,551,621 8,642,681 7,852,172 
 
NOTE: 2005 and 2006 statistics relate to Dewan Cement.   
 
Table -3 
      
 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
QUANTITATIVE DATA     
Clinker Production 426 420 280 341 281 
      
Cement Production 447 429 332 354 325 
      
Cement Dispatched 448 428 333 357 332 
      
ASSETS EMPLOYED     
Fixed Assets 7,168 6,340 5,667 4,463 4,095 
      
Long term Investments, Advances       
Loans, Deposits & Deferred Costs 809 909 802 934 935 
      
Current Assets 666 703 549 762 753 
      
Total Assets Employed 8,643 7,852 7,018 6,158 5,782 
      
FINANCED BY      
Shareholders Equity 1,218 1,148 1,116 1,213 1,186 
      
Redeemable Capital 6,357 5,517 5,086 75 77 
      
Long-Term Loans, Liabilities, Deposits       
& Import Bills Payable 253 262 278 1,900 1,888 
      
Obligations under Finance Lease & Deffered Income
- - - 1,839 1,634 
      
Current Liabilities 814 925 538 1,132 998 
      
TOTAL FUND INVESTED 8,643 7,852 7,018 6,158 5,782 
      
TURNOVER & PROFIT      
Turnover (Net) 1,031.20 927.55 717.64 860.15 732.36 
      
Operating Profit/(Loss) 112.16 88.33 -24.43 86.48 64.38 
      
Profit/(Loss) Before Taxarion 72.19 43.75 -91.84 31.13 6.49 
      
Profit/(Loss) After Taxation 70.73 31.4 -96.4 26.83 2.83 
      
Transfers to Reserves - - - - - 
      
Accumulated Profit/(Loss) c/f -1.56 -72.29 -103.69 -7.29 -34.12 
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Table -6 
COMPARISON OF CONSUMPTION- ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
Country Annual Consumption 
Per Capita 
  
 (000) tonse Consumption (kg) 
China 512 422 
Taiwan 20.8 960 
Malaysia 11.5 530 
Sri Lanka 2.2 118 
Indonesia 19.3 95 
India 85 89 
Pakistan 9.1 72 
 
Source: Cement Manufacturing Association Report 2004. 
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